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1 Introduction
Contingent valuation (CV) studies are increasingly used to estimate the value of
non-market goods and services, environmental goods or health care programs in
the absence of market prices. They raise methodological as well as practical issues
that have been extensively documented (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) and critically
assessed (see for instance Hausman, 1993). One major criticism of the CV method
has to do with its hypothetical nature, that is, there are no monetary incentives.
Because of this, respondents are more likely to misstate their true willingness to
pay (WTP), almost always by overstating what they would be willing to pay in
real situations — the so-called hypothetical bias (see for instance the meta analyses
of List and Gallet, 2001; Little and Berrens, 2004; Ash et al., 2004; or Murphy
et al., 2005a). Several calibration methods have been proposed in the literature
to counter-balance hypothetical bias,1 and one in particular has attracted a lot of
attention: the ’cheap talk’ technique.
Cheap talk consists in explicitly informing respondents of the existence of the
hypothetical bias and asking them to try to avoid it by answering as if they were
in a real situation (Cummings, Harrison and Osborne, 1995).2 Since Cummings
and Taylor’s (1999) article, which concluded that the cheap talk script was able
to mitigate the hypothetical bias, some thirty published CV studies have tested
the cheap talk approach. Some authors confirm the results of Cummings and
Taylor (1999),3 others have find no cheap talk eﬀect - or even a worsening of the
hypothetical bias - depending on the length of the script (Cummings, Harrison
and Osborne, 1995; Aadland and Caplan, 2006a; 2006b), the level of the bids
used in referenda (Brown et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2005b, Aadland et al., 2007;
Whitehead and Cherry, 2007), the experience / familiarity of respondents with
the good valued (List, 2001; Aadland and Caplan, 2003; Lusk, 2003), the nature
of the good (for instance, Samnaliev et al., 2003; Carlsson and Martinsson ,2006;
Brummett et al., 2007; or Blumenschein et al., 2008 obtain no significant eﬀect
with private goods whereas diﬀerentiated eﬀects are found in Aadland and Caplan,
2006a, b; Poe et al., 2002; Ajzen et al., 2004; or Bulte et al., 2005 with public
goods).
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One avenue has not yet been explored: the interaction between cheap talk and
the design of the hypothetical scenario implemented in the CV exercise. This is
surprising, because designing accurate scenarios precisely means that stated pref-
erences have to be in line with preferences when monetary incentives are binding,
so as to mitigate hypothetical bias.4 In this paper, we investigate the interaction
between cheap talk and scenario design using a comparative study. We explore
the influence of a neutral cheap talk script in three typical scenarios used in the
CV literature devoted to the valuation of air pollution eﬀects: a first scenario that
presents a new drug that decreases long-term health eﬀects of air pollution, a sec-
ond scenario that consists of a move to a less polluted city, and a third scenario
based on the implementation of new regional air pollution regulations. Half of
each subsample is exposed to a cheap talk script. Thus, the three scenarios are
used as relative benchmarks to explore potential diﬀerentiated eﬀects of a neutral
cheap talk script on stated WTP and protest answers.
In order to isolate the interaction between cheap talk and the scenario, we imple-
mented a simultaneous contingent valuation survey that allows for more control
of the survey design (see Chanel et al. 2006). We show that cheap talk has a
diﬀerentiated eﬀect depending on the scenario implemented. It decreases protest
responses with no eﬀect onWTP values in the scenario based on a new drug. When
a move to a less polluted city is involved, it has no eﬀect on protest responses but
decreases WTP values. Surprisingly, cheap talk increases protest responses but
decreases WTP values when new regional air pollution regulations are at stake.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
data and the experimental design. Section 3 presents the empirical results and
section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The experiment is a 2× 3 design to investigate the impact of cheap talk on valua-
tion when eliciting subjects’ WTP for the same environmental amenity but using
diﬀerent contextual framings. Experimental conditions involve being exposed (or
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not) to a cheap talk script before the valuation exercise starts and three diﬀerent
scenarios that essentially diﬀer in the scope of their beneficiaries.
The aim of the field experiment is to elicit WTP for a decrease in air-pollution-
related health eﬀects. To do so, we used three typical scenarios from the CV litera-
ture devoted to the valuation of air pollution eﬀects. The first scenario adopted the
methodology proposed by Alberini et al. (2004) and Krupnick et al. (2002). The
scenario asked subjects how much they would be willing to pay for a new drug, to
be taken on a monthly basis, that would reduce by half the long-term health eﬀects
of air pollution exposure, hereafter called Drug scenario (see Appendix A for the
hypothetical scenario).5 The second scenario, hereafter called Move scenario, asks
the subject his/her willingness to pay for moving with his/her household between
two cities, which are exactly the same (city size, housing, weather, public services
etc.) with the exception of the cost of living and the level of air pollution (Viscusi
et al., 1988; Chanel et al., 2006 —see Appendix B for the hypothetical scenario).6
We borrowed the third scenario, hereafter called Regulation scenario, from the New
Energy Externalities Developments for Sustanability project (NEEDS) supported
by the European Commission (Desaigues et al. 2007). It involves new rules and
laws applied to polluting firms and activities (industries, transport, etc.). Since
their implementation would increase the cost of living, through market prices, the
subject is asked the maximum amount s/he would be willing to pay each month
to implement this policy (see Appendix C for the hypothetical scenario).7 Note
that the change in the morbidity and mortality risks of air pollution presented
in each scenario are identical ("half less"). The concept of reducing air pollution
health eﬀects by half was progressively explained to subjects (see below) and based
on epidemiological data (see Künzli et al., 2000). It is also worth noting that the
payment vehicle is similar in all three scenarios: an increase in private expenditure.
We now present the cheap talk script used in the experiment, which can be
described as neutral and light (see appendix D for the script):
• The script can be considered as neutral (as opposed to positive). A positive
script states that the hypothetical bias leads to an overstating of real WTP.
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A neutral script either indicates to subjects the existence of the hypotheti-
cal bias without indicating its direction or indicates that, in a hypothetical
situation, subjects tend to over or understate their WTP as well as giving
protest answers. We chose the latter alternative.
• The script is light (as opposed to heavy) since no quantitative information
on the size of the hypothetical bias is provided to the subjects. In a heavy
version, the script gives precise numbers for the hypothetical bias. For in-
stance, Cummings and Taylor (1999) indicate to subjects that "on average,
[...] 38 percent of them voted "yes" [in the hypothetical situation whereas]
25 percent voted "yes" [in the real situation]" (p. 651).
As we had found no published articles quantifying hypothetical bias on French
data, we kept to a neutral and light version.8
The experiment was implemented in October 2006 in Marseilles (0.83 million in-
habitants), the second largest city in France and the largest city of the Bouches-du-
Rhône (BDR) district (1.9 million inhabitants). Subjects were recruited through
advertisements in local newspapers and regional TV news - the survey was de-
scribed as being about quality of life. Each participant was remunerated ?C20
using gift vouchers. Subjects were unaware of the exact topic of the survey prior
to the experiment. The experiment was conducted in the Regional Council voting
room, equipped with an electronic voting system allowing information on WTP
to be collected real time for up to 120 participants. Thus, all subjects in each
session completed their tasks simultaneously and full anonymity was maintained
(even to the research team). Full anonymity is vital, since List et al. (2004) for
instance have found that direct social interactions may aﬀect WTP for a public
good. Six sessions took place over two days. Each session was devoted to one
particular scenario (scenarios were drawn randomly) and cheap talk was randomly
implemented or not. Thus, at the end of the two days, we had 6 sessions testing
all possible combinations.
The CV experiment itself is divided into three parts. The first part contains a
self-administered survey with questions on the socioeconomic background of the
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subject and knowledge of air pollution. In particular three questions are devoted
to subjects’ experience of pollution, as in Lusk (2003): (1) self-reported knowledge
of air pollution, and whether the subject knows (2) the national oﬃcial scale
of air pollution levels (Atmo) and (3) the local air pollution index (Airmaraix).
Thereafter, the elicitation procedure begins. If the session is drawn as a cheap
talk session, a script is read aloud and presented to subjects on the main screen
of the voting room (as well as on individual screens) just after the scenario is
presented. Once the cheap talk script has been presented, the valuation exercise
starts. Subjects are asked, using an electronic voting system followed by an open-
ended question, their WTP for reducing air pollution health eﬀects by half.
Participants could register using the Public Economics Institute web site or a
dedicated phone line. As registration was not mandatory, the total number of
participants in each session varies (see Table 1). More than 75% of subjects live in
Marseilles and there are more women in our sample than in BDR population (65.05
versus 52.10, p < .001). Our sample is also younger, with 53% under 40 as opposed
to 33% in BDR, and 1% over 75 as opposed to 19% in the general population.
Household size appears to be the same as in the BDR (2.51 versus 2.3, p = .27).
There is no significant diﬀerence between monthly mean income in our sample and
monthly mean income in the BDR population (1,516 versus 1,536 euros p = .80)
and there is no significant diﬀerence for median income (1,250 versus 1,294, 95%
Confident Interval [1,200, 1,300]). However, analysis of the 25th percentile suggests
that subjects tend to be poorer than in the general BDR population. (610 euros
versus 900; 95% Confident Interval [547, 750]. We investigate the impact of cheap
talk on WTP in the diﬀerent scenarios in the next section.
3 Results
Unconditional cheap-talk eﬀects
i) Number of protest responses.9 Table 1 presents diﬀerent rates of protest
responses depending on the experimental session considered. Under standard con-
ditions (i.e. no cheap talk), the protest response rate for the Drug scenario (16%)
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Scenario Standard Cheap Talk All sessions
Drug ` of subjects 49 60 109
` of protests (rate) 8 (16%) 5 (8.3%) 13 (11.9%)
Move ` of subjects 86 43 129
` of protests (rate) 3 (3.5%) 1 (2.32%) 4 (3.1%)
Regulation ` of subjects 63 71 134
` of protests (rate) 2 (3.2%) 11 (15.5%) 13 (9.7%)
All scenarios ` of subjects 198 174 372
` of protests (rate) 13 (6.5%) 17 (9.8%) 30 (8.1%)
Table 1: Summary of statistics on protests by experimental session and scenario.
largely exceeds those for the Move scenario (3.5% - p = .011) and for the Regula-
tion scenario (3.2% — p = .018). There are no significant diﬀerences between the
Move and Regulation scenarios under standard conditions (p = .999). Cheap talk
has a diﬀerent impact for each scenario. It decreases (but not significantly) the
protest response rate in the Drug scenario from 16% to 8.3% (p = .163). It has no
visible impact in theMove scenario, where it moves from 3.5% to 2.3% (p = 0.500).
In the Regulation scenario, cheap talk has a positive and significant eﬀect on the
rate of protest responses (from 3.2% to 15.5% with p = .017) and thus reverses
the ranking of the Regulation and Drug scenarios on protest responses (although
non-significantly, p = 0.327). Overall, the protest response rate appears to be
relatively low (between 6.5% and 9.8%) and the average impact of cheap talk on
protest response rate is statistically non-significant (p = .346).
ii) WTP statistics. Table 2 shows that mean WTP first diﬀers depending on
which scenario has been used. The mean WTP obtained in the Move scenario,
taking standard conditions and cheap talk conditions together (?C80.15) is signif-
icantly and substantially higher than in the Drug (?C22.83 with p < .001) and
the Regulation (?C18.15 with p < 0.001) scenarios. There are no significant dif-
ferences between mean WTP for the Drug and Regulation scenarios (p = 0.263).
Second, the impact of cheap talk is qualitatively the same whatever the scenario
considered: a decrease in mean WTP. On average, the mean WTP significantly
decreases from ?C52.81 to ?C27.60 (48% — p < 0.001). However, this decrease is not
significant in the Drug (p = 0.268) and Move (p = .167) scenarios, while the 40%
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Scenario Standard Cheap Talk All sessions
Drug ` of subjects 49 60 109
Mean WTP (sd) ?C27.26 (50.4) ?C19.22 (21.9) ?C22.83 (37.5)
Mean WTP/Income 4.48 % 1.86 % 3.04%
Move ` of subjects 86 43 129
Mean WTP ?C89.29 (113.5) ?C61.86 (86.7) ?C80.15 (105.8)
Mean WTP/Income 7.96 % 8.96 % 8.29%
Regulation ` of subjects 63 71 134
Mean WTP ?C22.89 (28.9) ?C13.94 (23.5) ?C18.15 (26.5)
Mean WTP/Income 2.61 1.06% 1.78%
All scenarios ` of subjects 198 174 372
Mean WTP (sd) ?C52.81 (86.4) ?C27.60 (51.0) ?C41.02 (73.1)
Mean WTP/Income 5.42 % 3.25 % 4.41%
Table 2: Summary of statistics on WTP by experimental session and scenario.
drop in mean WTP is significant in the Regulation scenario (p = 0.050). We then
take subject’s income and compute in the mean of WTP divided by income. The
overall eﬀect of cheap talk on WTP when income is considered is less salient and
less significant — p = .0763 (this is also true for all scenarios with p-values .276,
.726 and .001 respectively for the Drug, Move and Regulation scenarios).
Conditional cheap-talk eﬀects
We have so far considered only diﬀerences in mean WTP or only taken into
account subject’s income when testing diﬀerences in mean. This latter normal-
ization may however be too rough and we therefore need to confirm the primary
findings on the eﬀects of cheap talk in a more systematic way, by taking into ac-
count subjects’ heterogeneity. We do so by first estimating a Heckman selection
model (Heckman, 1979): (1) a participation equation accounting for whether or
not the subject agrees to participate in the valuation exercise, i.e. subject does not
give a protest response and (2) a WTP equation for subjects who actually state a
WTP value. Since the Likelihood Ratio test cannot reject the null of independence
between the two statistical processes (LR=1.04 with p = .308), we maintain two
independent estimations in the following.10
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates and their corresponding p − values
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Drug × cheap talk .577 0.081
Move × cheap talk .396 0.494
Regulation × cheap talk -.926 0.019
LR joint nullity test: 34.29 (p < .0001)
Table 3: Probit equation (N = 360)
of the Probit model (dependent variable is one if the subject does not protest
in the valuation exercise).11 Among the explanatory variables tested, Age of the
subject (Age), Subject belongs to an environmental preservation association (En-
vPresAss) and Subject occasionally or regularly goes to the countryside to breathe
fresh air (FreshAir) are found significant (see appendix E for a description of the
explanatory variables). The older the subject the less s/he agrees to participate
in the valuation exercise. Belonging to an environmental preservation association
increases the probability of a protest response while going to the countryside to
breathe fresh air increases willingness to participate in the valuation exercise. Co-
eﬃcients estimated for the scenario eﬀect as well as for the cheap talk eﬀect confirm
unconditional results. TheMove and Regulation scenarios lead to significantly less
protest responses (p = .005 and .009 ) than the Drug scenario (used as the refer-
ent). This conditional eﬀect of the Cheap Talk script confirms the diﬀering results
shown in Table 1: it decreases the likelihood of a protest response in the Drug
(Drug × Cheap talk, p=.081) and Move scenarios (Move × Cheap talk, although
non-significantly: p = .494), but significantly increases the likelihood of a protest
response in the Regulation scenario (Regulation × Cheap Talk, p = .019).
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Table 4 presents the parameter estimates and the p-value of the WTP (in log-
arithm) equation.12 First, it is worth noting that the level of the subject’s income
(in logarithm) is highly significant (p = .005) and positively related to the log-
arithm of WTP, which is reassuring and provides evidence of the validity of the
method (Bishop and Woodward, 1995). Other explanatory variables are found
significant: subjects who have a University degree (UnivEdu, < 0.001) and pri-
vate health insurance (PrivIns, p = .069) are more likely to state higher WTP.
Subjects who never sort their waste (NevSortWaste) are more likely to state lower
WTP values (p = .041). Note that the three variables that account for the expe-
rience of subjects are not significant: declaring a good knowledge of air pollution
(KnowPol), knowing the local air pollution index (KnowAirmaraix) and knowing
the oﬃcial scale of air pollution that is published in the local and national media
(KnowAtmo).
The highly significant coeﬃcient associated with the Move scenario (p<.001)
and the positive but non-significant coeﬃcient of the Regulation scenario confirm
the results in Table 2: the Drug (referent) and Regulation scenarios lead to very
significantly lower WTP on average than the Move scenario. The percentage
changes inWTP values induced by theMove and Regulation scenarios with respect
to WTP elicited in the drug scenario (referent) are +227.2% and +13.9%.13
We now consider the eﬀect of the cheap talk script in the diﬀerent scenarios. In
the Drug scenario, the use of the cheap talk script does not significantly influence
subjects’ answers compared to the sessions without cheap talk (p = .725). This is
not true for the Move and Regulation scenarios: a significant decrease in WTP is
obtained when subjects are in the cheap talk session (p = .048 and .001 respec-
tively). The percentage changes in WTP values induced by the petition in the
Drug, Move and Regulation scenarios are -21.3%, -45.8% and -54.5% respectively.
Finally, because it has been shown that cheap talk fails to remove hypothetical
bias for experienced subjects (List, 2001), we investigate whether the eﬀect of cheap
talk on subjects varies with experience on air pollution. We do so as in Lusk (2003)
through the experience variables defined above. The additional cross eﬀects of
cheap talk and experience variables are not significant, whether taking self-reported
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degree of knowledge of air pollution problems (KnowPol, p =.382), knowing the
existing oﬃcial scale (KnowAtmo, p = .501) or knowing the local air pollution
index (KnowAirmaraix, p = .851). This absence of eﬀect regarding experience
variables may mask diﬀerentiated eﬀects of cheap talk that would depend on the
scenario. In order to rule out this possibility, we compute the corresponding joint
nullity Wald test, which cannot reject the null of no cross eﬀects (p = .950).
4 Conclusion
Our findings on the eﬀect of cheap talk in diﬀerent hypothetical scenarios are
mixed. First, we found that cheap talk has the expected eﬀect on WTP values in
the Move and Regulation scenarios. It decreases WTP values most sharply in the
Regulation scenario. It has, however, no significant eﬀect in the Drug scenario.
Cheap talk therefore has a diﬀerentiated eﬀect on WTP values in our setting,
depending on the hypothetical scenario implemented, with a greater eﬀect when
the scenario implies a greater role for future public intervention (Regulation).
Second, cheap talk has an undetermined eﬀect on protest responses. It decreases
protest responses in the Drug scenario but it increases protest responses in the
Regulation scenario, with no eﬀect in the Move scenario. The cheap talk script
states that the hypothetical nature of the exercise can lead subjects to give protest
responses. On the one hand, this may lead subjects who may have been unaware of
this possibility to take advantage of this opportunity and protest in the valuation
exercise, even though they would not have done so without this prior information.
On the other hand, the decrease in protest responses could be due to subjects who
initially consider protesting in the valuation exercise, but actually refrain from
doing so. Aadland and Caplan (2006a) expect a decrease in participation rate due
to cheap talk and find an increase in participation rate as we find in the Drug
scenario. Their neutral cheap talk script does not, however, mention any form of
protest response and they do not detect protest responses for those who refused to
participate. Protest responses are typically those given by respondents who care
about air pollution but who refuse to pay in the hypothetical scenario. In that
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sense, it can be argued that protest responses are not desirable and a cheap talk
script should eliminate them, or at least reduce them.
Third, we find no cross-eﬀect of experience/knowledge and cheap talk. Our re-
sults therefore contradict those of List (2001) and Lusk (2003): cheap talk can have
a persuasive eﬀect on both experienced and inexperienced subjects. We therefore
cannot confirm the assumption that experienced and inexperienced subjects have
a diﬀerent “processing mode” when receiving the cheap talk signal (List, 2001).14
However, it could be argued that our explanatory variables do not capture suﬃ-
ciently well whether or not subjects have experience regarding air pollution. Some
subjects stating that they possess good knowledge of air pollution and know the
oﬃcial index and scale of air pollution levels may, in reality, be inexperienced
subjects. As a consequence, we may not find any significant eﬀect because our
“experienced” group actually also contains “inexperienced” subjects.15 On the
other hand, it is worth remembering that questions related to experience were
asked before the valuation exercise (subjects did not yet know that the survey was
about air pollution and involved a valuation task). Hence, subjects did not have
any particular incentive to behave “strategically” in replying to these questions.
Does examining the eﬀect of cheap talk help us identify which scenario among
the three implemented in this paper is the most reliable for eliciting WTP for im-
provements in air quality? Ideally, one would like to design hypothetical scenarios
without hypothetical biases and protest responses in which cheap talk would in-
deed have no eﬀect on WTP values. Evidence from the Drug and Move scenarios is
not fully conclusive: the Drug scenario induces too many protest responses, while
cheap talk induces a significant decrease in WTP values in the Move scenario. In
our findings, the Regulation scenario is the most sensitive to cheap talk and is
therefore the most questionable scenario.
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Notes
1These methods can be ex-ante or ex-post. Ex-ante approches consist of reminding respon-
dents about the existence of substitutes and/or their budget constraints and consequantialist
approaches. Ex-post methods sort answers according to the degree of respondents’ self-reported
uncertainty or use valuation experiments in the lab to correct CV answers outside the lab.
2The term cheap talk in the CV literature comes from game theory, where it is defined as a
verbal communication (talk) which is costless(cheap), non-binding and non-verifiable .
3See for instance Ajzen et al. (2004), Bulte et al. (2005), Carlsson et al. (2005), List et al.
(2006) or Landry and List (2007).
4This is indeed one of its primary objective as stated for instance in the NOAA’s (1993)
recommandations.
5Note that our approach diﬀers from Alberini et al (2004) and Krupnick et al (2002): when
they present the new drug to respondents, they do not refer explicitly to air pollution — the drug
is only associated with a reduction in mortality risks.
6The air quality in Marseilles, the largest city of the area, was used as a reference situation
for all respondents.
7Here again, air quality in Marseilles was used as a referent.
8Recent studies show that cultural diﬀerences may lead to varying hypothetical biases, in-
cluding no or even negative biases (Ehmke et al., 2008).
9Protest responses are when subjects express null WTP and give a reason in closed-ended
debriefing questions or open comments that can be described as protests (for instance, “I do
not agree with the principle of paying”, “I would not pay since I will only move to live in the
country”, “I do not agree to pay to move to a less polluted place when I can die tomorrow
crossing the street” or “I do not want to pay because the factories are the major polluters”).
10Results obtained in the selection model are clearly equivalent to those obtained with two
independent equations.
11Due to the limited number of protest responses (n=30 in the initial sample), a specification
procedure was use to select a smaller number of covariates in the Probit equation (although we
kept all the session and cheap talk dummy variables due to the objective of this study).
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12As well as computing the Heckman selection model, we estimated a Box-Cox linear model
where the WTP is transformed according to a Box-Cox transformation (see Davidson and McK-
innon, 1993). LR tests on the estimated transformation parameter (θ = −.0438) reject equality
to one (p < .0001) or minus one (p < .0001) but cannot reject its nullity (p = .223), that is
using the logarithm of the WTP — much easier to handle. In doing so, we however lost some
observations — true zero WTP: 12 observations, i.e. 3.2% of the sample. The model was then
estimated by maximum likelihood procedure in Stata 9.0 and p-values were computed using the
robust variance-covariance matrix (seven other observations were dropped from the analysis due
to missing data, mainly on income).
13Because the WTP equation is semilogarithmic, the percentage changes in WTP values in-
duced by the petition are computed as per Kennedy (1981).
14Based on social psychology findings, List (2001) uses “processing mode” to mean the fact that
individuals with strong opinions prior to the valuation exercice are more likely to reject external
signals, i.e. invididuals are less sensitive to “the contagious influence of others” (Michelson, 1999,
cited by List, 2001).
15Note that the approach based on free evocation questions aimed at detecting respondents
with stronger opinions in CV surveys may be an interesting way to improve the detection of
“experienced” subjects (see Flachaire, Hollard and Luchini 2007).
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A Drug scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the best
decision for yourself and your household.
Let’s imagine that the Ministry of Health has authorized a new drug, diﬀerent
from those currently available. It allows the long-term eﬀects of air pollution ex-
posure to be reduced by half. It simply involves taking a pill every month, which,
by the combined action of several vitamins, stimulates immunological responses. It
has no side eﬀects and no contra-indications. It can be taken by any person who
is more than 5 years old.
This new drug is reimbursed neither by the social security system nor by the
CMU (state means-tested health cover) nor by the complementary health insurance
policies. This implies that, if you choose to buy it, you will bear the full cost. We
would like to know how much you would be willing to pay to use this drug, which
would reduce by half the long-term diseases and mortality risks associated with
air pollution. Do not forget that this money will be drawn from your household’s
budget! You will therefore have less money at the end of the month for consumption
or savings.
B Move scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the best
decision for yourself and your household.
Let’s imagine that you and your household have to move. You can choose
between two cities which are exactly equivalent in terms of inhabitants, working
conditions, schools, climate, public services, cultural life, transport, housing, sur-
roundings, etc. There is only one diﬀerence between them: the level of atmospheric
pollution. The first city - let’s call it POL - is as polluted as Marseilles. And the
second city - let’s call it LESSPOL - is half as polluted as Marseilles.
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The problem is that the cost of living is higher in LESSPOL (the less polluted
city): housing, local taxes, public transport, etc. are more expensive. This means
that if you choose to move to LESSPOL, you will have to pay more to have the
same standard of living as in POL.
We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay per month for
you and your household to move to LESSPOL (the less polluted city) rather than
to POL (the town as polluted as Marseilles). Do not forget that this money will
be drawn from your household’s budget! You will therefore have less money at the
end of the month for consumption and savings.
C Regulation scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the best
decision for yourself and your household.
Let’s imagine that new laws and rules are to be adopted to limit air pollution.
Therefore industries, manufacturers of consumer products, public or private trans-
port, will have to adopt less polluting technologies. Studies have shown that these
new laws and rules will make it possible to reduce by half the number of highly
polluted days in the PACA region, and particularly in Marseilles.
The implementation of these new technologies will induce higher costs in every-
day life: energy, food and other goods, transport. This means that you will have
to pay more to enjoy the same standard of living as before the implementation of
these new laws and rules.
We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay per month for
these new laws and rules to be implemented. Do not forget that this money will
be drawn from your household’s budget! You will therefore have less money at the
end of the month for consumption and savings.
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D Cheap Talk script
Similar studies show that the amount subjects are willing to pay can diﬀer from
what they would pay in real life.
For instance, some subjects state a lower willingness to pay in relation to what
they would otherwise pay, or even refuse to pay anything. This could be explained
by the fact that they want to express a point of view such as “I have the right
to breathe good quality air” or “I shouldn’t have to pay for good quality air; it’s
polluting firms or the state who should pay”.
On the other hand, people may state a higher amount than they would pay in
real life, that is, if they really had to pay out of their pockets.
We would like you to try not to behave like these people, but to answer as
sincerely as possible.
If you want to make any comments concerning the amount of money you state
which you didn’t have the opportunity to verbalize during the procedure, don’t hes-
itate to write them down at the end of the questionnaire, where a space is devoted
to your comments.
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E Sample descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean (sd)
log(Indinc) Logarithm of Monthly individual 6.974 (.765)
income (euros)
Male Subject is male (=1) .349 (.477)
Age Age of the subject (years) 39.7 (14.19)
HSEdu Senior High School Education (=1) .163 (.370)
UnivEdu University level Education (=1) .362 (.481)
Owner Status of the occupant of the .465 (.499)
place of residence (=1)
LivMars Subject lives in Marseilles (=1) .752 (.432)
EnvPresAss Subject belongs to an environmental .489 (.050)
preservation association (=1)
PrivIns Subject has private health .819 (.384)
insurance (=1)
Marsgood Subject says that the air quality in .059 (.236)
Marseilles is good or very good (=1)
HealthWork Subject is a health worker (=1) .537 (.225)
ChangHab Subject changes habits during .580 (.494)
highly polluted days (=1)
FreshAir Subject regularly goes to .798 (.401)
countryside to breathe fresh air (=1)
RespolT Subject has personally felt the eﬀects .53 (.225)
of air pollution (=1)
NevSortWaste Subject never sorts his/her waste (=1) .209 (.407)
Unlucky Subject considers him/herself unlucky .134 (.341)
in everyday life on average (=1)
KnowPol Subject declares a good .241 (.428)
knowledge of air pollution (=1)
KnowAirmaraix Subject knows the AIRMARAIX local .239 (.427)
air pollution index (=1)
KnowAtmo Subject knows the ATMO oﬃcial scale .231 (.422)































Drug × cheap talk -.099 0.725
Move × cheap talk -.498 0.048
Regulation × cheap talk -.628 0.001
Experience and cheap talk eﬀects
KnowPol × cheap talk .283 0.382
KnowAtmo × cheap talk .210 0.501
KnowAirmaraix × cheap talk .056 0.851
Fisher joint nullity test: F(28,282)=10.02, p=0.0000
Table 4: Log(WTP) equation (N = 311)
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